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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear arms have become an inescapable element of
the human condition in the past forty years. Currently
the United States and the Soviet Union possess nuclear
bombs enough to annihilate all mankind. Finding ways to
mitigate the danger of nuclear wars and to secure a less
threatening future is the most urgent issue in the field
of international relations as veil as in United States
security policy making.
The current nuclear peace occurs in a bipolar
system where both of the leading powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, possess arsenals permitting
each to inflict so much damage on the other even in a
second strike that they have a strong interest in
avoiding war. This condition of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) has also helped prevent large scale
conventional conflicts between the superpowers since
both fear any such conflict would escalate to nuclear
exchange . 1
One great danger to the current nuclear balance
would be the emergence of a third nuclear power
possessing enough nuclear capability that each current
superpower has to consider not only the presence of the
1
other but also that of the third when determining its
security policy. Judging from present nuclear
capability, overall resources, and foreign policy goals,
the most likely candidate for the role of third nuclear
superpower in the future is the People's Republic of
China . 2 The United States has to be prepared for a
situation in which China strengthens its nuclear power
to the point that it also acquires second strike
capability.
This Master's thesis will examine the following
question: how would China's attainment of Mutual Assured
Destruction capability affect the security of the United
States? The fields of United States security policy
which will be examined are: deterrence, war fighting,
and arms control. I will examine how a change from
bipolarity to tripolarity on the system level would
affect the achievement of the United States 's nuclear
policy goals, and where necessary, how United States
strategy should be altered to achieve those goals.
Since the actual implication of Chinese second
strike capability depends on China's foreign policy, the
main question will be investigated separately in three
possible scenarios. The first assumes that China stays
neutral between the current superpowers. With China
being an independent power, this forms an equilateral
2
triangular power system. The second scenario assumes a
S ino-Amer ican alliance, and the third, a Sino-Soviet
alliance. In both of these, two points of the triangle
lie closer to each other and third is relatively
isolated
.
In addition to the above alliance systems among the
three actors, I am aware that there is one more possible
case: a Soviet-Amer ican alliance. However, I purposely
dropped this scenario. This is because, judging from
the present hostility between them, it is highly
unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union
would form an alliance against the third party. Hence,
all of my scenarios premise continued strong antagonism
between the two nations.
To further simplify the three scenarios I assume
that China has a consistent foreign policy toward both
current superpowers, and the United States does not have
to worry about unpredictability of China's action when
it makes its nuclear policy.
In the conclusion I will investigate whether a
tripolar nuclear system would be more stable than a
bipolar nuclear system. As the following examinations
indicate, the answer to the above question depends
heavily on actor alignments.
3
CHAPTER II
SCENARIO I: NONALIGNED CHINA
This scenario assumes, as other two, an
international system among the three actors whose power
is roughly equal. I assume that the antagonism between
the United States and the Soviet Union still exists, and
China's attitude to both is neutral. Here, the United
States has to deal with the relation with the Soviet
Union, but it also has to take account of China; China
will be a net gainer if the other two fight and thereby
weaken each other.
A. Deterrence
A tripolar system where China stays neutral will
stabilize deterrence between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Unlike in the bipolar system, one party's
loss is no longer a direct gain for the other. The
presence of the third independent actor will complicate
the remaining two nations' calculation of gains and
losses. This greater uncertainty will force them to act
more cautiously. This, in turn, stems from the fact
that all superpowers wish to avoid a situation in which
any one of them would be able to dominate the other two.
4
1. Basic Deterrence
The basic deterrence for the United States would be
further stabilized in this tripolar system. The
tripolarity would give the Soviet Union as well as the
United States less incentive to attack the other. There
are two reasons for this. First of all, the realization
of Mutual Assured Destruction between the United States
and the Soviet Union would be even more horrifying in
the tripolar system. Secondly, the potential gain which
each party would acquire by attacking first, even if it
escapes retaliation, would be less in the tripolarity.
Thus in this tripolar system potential gains and losses
as a result of action would change in an unfavorable way
for the aggressor. I will examine these reasonings in
more detail in the following paragraphs.
Even now fear that the United States will retaliate
and inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union in
response to a first strike deters the Soviet Union from
attacking the United States; after exchanging their
nuclear weapons, both nations will be much worse off
than they are before. Even if their attack is limited
to destruction of each other's nuclear arsenals,
creating casualties of a certain percentage of its
population, they would be certainly weakened. However,
it might be still possible for them to remain as the two
5
As long as the
most powerful nations in the world,
nuclear exchange is limited to a certain degree, they do
not have to worry too much that the international system
will be dominated by a hegemonic power afterwards.
After a Sovie t-Amer ican nuclear exchange in the
tripolar system, however, not only the two would be
seriously weakened, but also their relative decline will
be an automatic gain for China. As long as China stays
neutral and does not allow itself to be involved in the
nuclear fight between the others, it would emerge as a
stronger power over the other two powers after the
fight. Thus, even limited nuclear exchange in the
tripolar system would have more serious implications
than in the bipolar system: the possibility of becoming
subordinated to the third party.
The second reason I assume that the Soviet Union
would be further deterred from aggression in this system
is that this tripolar system brings reduced profit even
if Soviet Union succeeds in escaping severe
retaliation. Credibility of capability and of will to
retaliate are the twin pillars of deterrence. However,
even if the opponent sees absolutely no credibility in
your retaliatory capability or will, it does not mean he
will immediately attack. Attack also requires a
positive motivation; the opponent must perceive a gain
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that can be acquired only by attacking. Before deciding
to attack, a state has to make a political calculation
of "what gains and what losses would result, for the
state which is the object of deterrence, from action on
the one hand, or abstention on the other ?" 3
Thus even if the Soviet Union should believe that
the United States will not retaliate in response to the
Soviet attack in fear of its counter-retaliation or that
the Soviet Union can win the fight, the gain for the
Soviet Union by attacking is considerably less in the
tripolar system. In the bipolar system there are only
two principal actors; getting rid of the other
automatically confers dominance on oneself. On the
other hand even if the Soviet Union manages to wipe out
the United States in this tripolar system, there is no
guarantee that it can automatically dominate the
international system. Even after extinguishing the
United States there still would be one more actor,
China, which the Soviet Union has to worry about in the
new bipolar system. Even though China is a neutral
nation toward the United States-Soviet hostilities, it
does not mean that the Soviet Union can coexist with
China in a new bipolar system after getting rid of the
United States from the international system . 4
7
All of the above conditions would apply equally to
the United States or China if either became an
aggressor. Compared to the bipolar system, attacking
the homeland of any other superpower would bring the
same losses from retaliation. Yet even if retaliation
were weak or not forthcoming, aggression would bring
less profit in this tripolar system. As a result mutual
deterrence should be enhanced in this power system; the
system would provide the potential aggressor too little
gain and too much cost, whether he wins or loses the
game. Hence, even when it has a chance, the aggressor
would be discouraged from taking the opportunity; the
rational calculation would conclude that the gain would
not worth the cost involved and it is better to coexist
with the enemy than try to attack it.
At first glance, there seems to be one situation in
which a country might be encouraged to strike first in
this system. This involves a limited nuclear exchange.
The Soviet Union might assume that in case of a limited
initial attack, the United States would be more inclined
to accept the damage and agree to negotiate due to the
presence of the third actor. The rationale behind this
assumption is that the United States, having received,
for instance, a Soviet attack limited to 60% of its
land-based missiles, would fear using up a significant
8
part of its remaining arsenal to retaliate the Soviet
Union. On the one hand the United States would want to
strike back the Soviet Union. On the other hand doing
so would leave the United States quite vulnerable
against China. Even though China is a neutral nation it
would be dangerous for the United States not to have
enough capability to deter it. Thus the Soviet Union
might conclude that the United States retaliation is
less credible in the tripolar system. If this is the
case, deterrence will be destabilized.
However, even if the Soviet Union believes in
decreased American credibility, I assume that the
decreased potential profit and increased loss by
resorting to aggression would outweigh the likely
benefit from the United States's possible decision to
refrain from retaliation. Moreover, even in event of a
limited first strike, the Soviets could not be certain
that the United States would not strike back. The
United States might calculate that the Soviets would
refrain from counter-retaliation in the same kind of
fear that escalation would leave the Soviet Union
vulnerable to China.
To sum up, by and large it would be less likely in
this tripolar system that the Soviet Union strikes first
compared to in the bipolar system, and it would be
9
easier to achieve deterrence. The United States should
maintain its present nuclear capability to deter the
Soviet Union. It should also make efforts to avoid
encouraging the Soviet Union to believe that it will
rather negotiate than retaliate after being attacked.
2
. Extended Deterrence
As in the case of basic deterrence, extended
deterrence will be more stable in the tripolar system
for the same reason I mentioned above: the potential
gain from attacking is less in the presence of the third
superpower. In order to consider the case of extended
deterrence against the Soviet nuclear attack, let us
assume that an intensive conflict which involves
conventional weapons takes place in Europe. At the
height of such a conflict, the Soviet Union would have
to consider the United States's likely response and the
presence of China before it decides whether to launch
nuclear missiles at British and French missile silos.
Two likely scenarios in terms of an American response
would cross the Soviet strategists' minds even in case
of a limited counter-force strike.
First, fearing to risk the security of its own
nation, in other words, fearing counter-retaliation from
the Soviet Union, the United States might decide not to
10
retaliate and agrees to negotiate with the Soviets.
Alternatively, the United States might decide to resort
to a retaliation, inflicting a counter
-force second
strike against Warsaw Pact nations. This would destroy
the Pact's conventional military bases, and victimize
some civilian populations.
In this tripolar scenario the Soviets would more
likely refrain from attack, thinking that the United
States would be more inclined to retaliate. This is
because the United States would likely think that there
is a less possibility that their retaliation would be
followed by a Soviet counter-retaliation. In this
scenario after the United States retaliates against the
initial Soviet aggression, the burden of war escalation
would be on the Soviet side. The Soviets would have two
choices after the American retaliation. First is a
counter-retaliation, bombing the remaining NATO bases.
In this case war would very likely escalate to the
extent of counter-value attack or worse, even of nuclear
exchange between the superpowers' homelands. The second
choice is to refrain from counter-retaliation and
negotiate with the United States out of the fear that
war would escalate to counter-value attack or to
homeland-to-homeland attack. In this tripolar scenario
the United States would have a good reason to believe
11
that the Soviets would be more reluctant to escalate war
and refrain from counter-retaliation. Unlike in a
bipolar system the Soviet Union would have to take the
presence of China into consideration. Occupation of
NATO would be meaningless for the Soviet Union if it
becomes so weakened in the process of the war that China
could easily attack and defeat it.
Moreover, even if the Soviets think that the United
States would not retaliate, what the Soviet Union would
gain by attacking Europe is less in the tripolar
system. With the presence of the third power, the
United States's loss of a part of Europe would not
automatically transfer to the Soviet's gain. The Soviet
Union would gain power relatively to the United States,
but it would not lead to the situation where the
augmented Soviet Union totally topples the balance of
the international system. Here, the third actor, China
would play a role of cushion. Moreover, the Soviets can
foresee the Soviet gain of power will make China uneasy,
and likely cause a conflict between China and itself.
It might even encourage China to ally with the United
States against the Soviet Union. Thus, there is less
advantage for the Soviet in striking Europe in the
tripolar system.
12
Moreover, the horrifying outcome of the second
scenario would further discourage the Soviet
aggression. As examined in the section of basic
deterrence. Mutual Assured Destruction or even limited
attack against each other's homeland would bring a worse
result to the both superpowers in the tripolar system
than in the bipolar system. Starting with Europe, the
two nations bomb each other and end up with being under
the dominance of China.
Even if the Soviets know that the net gain for
aggression would be less in the tripolar system than in
the bipolar system, it still might decide to attack
Europe if it can be fairly certain that the United
States will definitely refrain from retaliation. This
might occur if tripolarity eroded United States will to
retaliate because of worry about China.
Retaliation against an enemy's attack on allies is
always accompanied by the possibility that the enemy
will then counter-retal iate against the homeland. In
the bipolar system, however, it is only the Soviet Union
which the United States has to worry about. Retaliation
might invite counter-retaliation and inflict damage in
the American homeland, but the only enemy which the
United States is confronting would be also considerably
weakened by the retaliation. In the tripolar system.
13
presence of
the United States would have to take the
China to consideration before it decides to retaliate.
The retaliation would require the United States to use
its weapons for the sake of its allies, and the United
States would have to expose its homeland and military
force against the Soviet attack in case of escalation.
This would make the United States quite vulnerable to
China, which would retain its nuclear forces intact even
after the United States consumed a substantial amount of
its force. Since it would be the United States 's
interest to deter the China's attack against its
homeland even while its allies are in trouble, this
tripolar system might diminish the United States's
resolution to retaliate against the Soviet attack
against its allies, thereby weakening extended
deterrence. The United States might regard keeping the
nuclear balance among three principal actors in the
system as more important than protecting particular
allies
.
As mentioned above, however, I still believe that
discouragement due to the reduction of likely gain would
outweigh the Soviet's stimulus to attack based on the
increased chance of the United States non-retaliation.
Even if the Soviet Union succeeds in acquiring a part of
Europe, this would not entitle the Soviet Union to gain
14
a relative power significantly on its hand and become a
hegemonic power. it would still have to cope with
China. This decreased gain by attacking is easily
perceivable in this system. Next, the United States
might appear less determined to retaliate the Soviet
aggression in this system, but there would still be a
great uncertainty about whether the United States would
fight back or not. With this certainly diminished gain
by attacking and still uncertain American response, it
would be a too much risk for the Soviet Union to strike
the American ally.
I have been using NATO nations as examples of an
object of extended deterrence. The same logic
explaining the enhanced extended deterrence in NATO
would also apply to the case of Japan. A Soviet attack
against Japan would be conventional. Even if the combat
is limited to conventional means, weakening of its force
due to the war with the United States would be risky,
considering the presence of China. Moreover, the fear
that any conventional war could escalate to nuclear war
which would make the Soviet Union further vulnerable to
China would deter the Soviet aggression against Japan.
Besides, considering the geographical proximity of
Japan to China, it would be even more unlikely that the
Soviet Union resorts to aggression against Japan than
15
against Europe. Attacking Japan would unavoidably
threaten and hence provoke China. The Soviet presence
in Japan would be perceived as a more significant threat
by China than its presence in Europe. Thus the Soviet
attempt to attack Japan would be more discouraged by the
presence of China than in the bipolar system.
Credibility of will to retaliate depends on the
nature of the stakes. In order for the United States to
look credible to retaliate, it is even more important
than in the bipolar system that the United States
strengthens the tie and coherence with its allies so
that the Soviet Union believes the United States places
great value on Europe and Japan. 3
3. Crisis Stability
It should be easier to achieve crisis stability in
a tripolar system of equidistant alignments. The Soviet
Union has less reason to fear that the United States
will launch a missile in an intensive crisis. The
Soviet Union would have less gain in attacking first, so
would the United States. The Soviet Union would be more
firmly convinced that the United States would refrain
from striking first in the tripolar system.
The fear that the other party will strike first is
based on the assumption that the opponent's first strike
16
will destroy much of its own capability to retaliate.
The Soviet Union would suppose that the United States
would be further restrained from the first strike in the
tripolar system, since the incentives to fight is low in
that system. The Soviet's assumption would be that even
if the United States were to strike first and win the
fight, this would not make the United States the
hegemonic power in the international system. It still
would have to share the ruling role with China and the
loss of the Soviet Union would most likely cause a
severe conflict with China.
Thus the tripolar system gives a greater crisis
stability effect among the actors than the bipolar
system. However, there would be one potential threat to
crisis stability inherent in this system: a catalytic
war. Since any war between the current superpowers
would be China's gain, China might be attempted to
attack either state, disguising it is an attack by the
other current superpower in hopes of leading the two
states to fight each other until both suffered
considerable damage. Such a concern was actually
expressed seriously in the current bipolar system by the
Soviet leaders.®
Conditions where the superpowers might be dragged
into a nuclear war by the third party are identified by
Henry S. Rowen. These conditions are:
17
1. The third party has nuclear weapons and a
delivery capability;
2. The third party has a motive or causes; and
3. The superpowers' forces, intelligence, and
mindsets are susceptible to being triggered by
such an attack. 7
In the tripolar system the first condition is fully
met, and nonaligned China in this tripolar system is
more likely to meet the second condition. If the other
two superpowers became involved in a nuclear war by one
va y or another
,
both nations would be definitely worse
off than before. The relative gain of power accruing to
China might be sufficient to make it the dominant power,
without engaging in any war with either the Soviet Union
or the United States. Rowen further identifies special
conditions to catalyze a war after the United States or
the Soviet Union were attacked:
1. high political tension between the United States
and the USSR;
2. forces on high alert status;
3. intelligence and warning systems unable to
discriminate between attack by another superpower
and attack by the third party;
4. at least one of the "target" superpowers has a
"hair-trigger" nuclear launch policy.®
18
To discourage a catalytic attack from China and also
to avoid being dragged into such a tragic and unnecessary
fight, two steps would have to be taken by both the
United States and the Soviet Union. First, it would be
necessary to increase their intelligence performance so
that they could accurately identify the source of attack
even in the height of tension. Although it would be very
difficult against sea-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), the Soviet Union and the United States should
make efforts against land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBHs). The known ability of both
states to identify where a land-based attack came from
would discourage China's ambition to make the other two
start fighting. Second, both nations would need to
exercise careful control over launching weapons. This
involves, first, avoiding a general launch-on-warning
policy. It also involves imposing controls to ensure
that missiles are launched only when authorized.
B. War Fighting
The United States would probably find this tripolar
system more favorable for achieving its war fighting
policy goals than a bipolar system. As long as there is
a third actor in the system who can very likely become
the dominant military power in the international system
19
after the other two fight, the United States and the
Soviet Union would be encouraged to act very prudently
even after an initial battle takes place. Their common
interest in avoiding the consequence of China emerging
as a hegemon able to dominate the other two would impose
some moderation even in warfare.
In the bipolar system "(Flirst and foremost, the
Soviet leadership fears defeat , not the suffering of
damage "
.
* This tendency would likely be modified
in this tripolar system; even if it avoids defeat, the
Soviet Union would have to fear the suffering of
extensive damage in the tripolarity system, since it
would want to maintain the capability to function as a
nation to deal with China after the war. This shift of
the Soviet emphasis would in turn make the achievement
of the United States war-fighting goals easier; it takes
two parties to limit the intensity of war. Both the
United States and the Soviet Union would want to limit
the scale of war so that they could still remain as
principal actors in the system after war.
Since direct resort to nuclear war is unlikely,
this section assumes that an American-Soviet nuclear war
starts in a limited way as a result of escalation from
the conventional warfare.
20
1. War Winning
In the tripolar system the war-winning goal and
methods to achieve it would be preserved in pretty much
the same way as in the bipolar system. However, its
relative priority would likely be ranked among other
goals in a different way. Damage limitation, war
termination, and escalation control would gain in
relative importance compared to war winning. War
winning would not be useful unless the winner retained
sufficient capability to cope with China after the war.
While the United States is engaged in war with the
Soviet Union, it would always have to keep it in its
mind that China would be there intact.
2. War Termination
Early war termination would be even more important
in the tripolar system than in the bipolar system. A
different expectation would exist for war termination in
the tripolar system, however, compared to in the bipolar
system. In the bipolar system what the both nations
wish is to terminate war at least before catastrophic
holocaust. In the tripolar system they would have to
terminate war at a much earlier stage, before China
becomes able to dominate the two nations damaged by
nuclear exchange.
21
In the bipolar system even if the United States
emerges with its military capability severely reduced
and its economic, industrial sectors seriously damaged
after the war, it does not have to worry too much about
another power attempting to take advantage of the
situation. In the tripolar system, however, the United
States would have to consider the possible aggression by
the third power, China. After terminating war with the
Soviet Union, the United States would still have to be
powerful enough to deter China's attack. In the
following I will examine how the United States strategy
should be altered to achieve its war-fighting policy
goals in the tripolar system.
War termination requires mutual agreement at least
to a cease-fire, which, in turn, means that two nations
have to be able to communicate with each other.
Invulnerable, reliable communication systems between the
United States and the Soviet Union are an essential
prerequisite for war termination. At present two
nations are depending on the "hot line" to communicate
between White House and Kremlin which is quite
vulnerable to nuclear attack. This fragile
communication system which would be destroyed even by a
limited attack on each capital is criticized even in the
status quo . 3- 0 In the tripolar system where the United
22
States and the Soviet Union have a greater incentive to
negotiate after nuclear war breaks out, it is
indispensable for the United States with a joint effort
with the Soviet Union to build survivable and effective
communication links.
Secondly, there should be a considerable shift in
the United States targeting on the Soviet Union. in the
current plans the Soviet Union's C 3 I facilities are
listed as a relatively early target 11 in an
expectation that less retaliation would occur if Soviet
command and communications systems were disrupted. The
assumptions behind this are that once nuclear war
starts, disrupting the Soviet command system at least
has a possibility to limit damage on the United States,
since it will cause enough chaos in the political and
military sectors to deny political leaders control of
their forces and thus decrease scale of its attack . 12
Even in a bipolar system this assumption can be
Questioned. In a tripolar system it becomes even more
dangerous. Therefore, the current strategy to include
its C 3 I network as an early target has to be
modified. The United States would have greater need to
negotiate with the Soviet Union during war in this
tripolar system, and its attack on the Soviet
communication systems would eliminate the chance for the
23
political leaders to negotiate with the opponents.
Moreover, disruption of the communication systems would
make it impossible for the Soviet leaders to issue
orders to their armed forces to halt attacks even when
they decide to do so. Negotiation to end war would be
meaningless unless the order to cease fire can be sent,
received, and followed.
Similarly, the United States should not adopt
"decapitation" strategies making the Soviet leadership a
target. It requires political leaders in the Soviet
Union to negotiate and terminate war. Moreover,
destroying the Soviet leadership would put the United
States in a great risk, by transferring the control of
Soviet war fighting from the political leaders to
military commanders. At least some of them would
likely launch attacks, negating any prospect of war
termination
.
By the same token it would be the United States's
strong interest to make its own 0*1 network more
secure against a possible Soviet attack so that its own
political leaders could stay in charge of its command.
It takes two parties to communicate; the United States 's
exempting the Soviet C 3 I system from attack would be
meaningless unless the United States could secure its
own system. This aspect is particularly worrisome when
24
one thinks of the current Soviet nuclear targeting
doctrine; the Soviet strategy is to resort to a rapid
and massive attack on the United States C 3 I system to
limit damage once nuclear war breaks out. 13
Currently the United States lags behind the Soviet
Union in terms of the C 3 survivability and protection
of the political and military leadership:
Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union has placed great
emphasis on ensuring the survivability during a
nuclear exchange of the Soviet leadership....
Shelters have been constructed for about 110,000
members of the leadership, made up of some 5,000
party and government officials at the national and
republic level; 63,000 party and government leaders
at krai
,
oblast
. city, and urban ra ion level;
2.000 managers of key installations; and about
40.000 members of civil defense staffs.
Moreover, C 3 I systems are much more dispersed and
redundant in the Soviet Union. The United States does
not possess this kind of extensive protection measures
against its own C 3 I system. In the tripolar system
the increased importance of war-termination goal would
require the United States to improve the current
vulnerable C 3 I systems and measures to protect
political leaders at least to the extent of the Soviet
Union's so that the United States could leave a
possibility to negotiate and terminate war.
25
3. Escalation Control
Escalation control involves influencing the
intensity of war. Hence it refers to two kinds of
ability. One is ability to choose an appropriate time
and rate to escalate war when intensification would
yield advantages. The other is ability to prevent war
from intensifying when further intensification of war is
disadvantageous. The intention behind seeking this
latter ability is to "deter escalation and coerce the
enemy into negotiating a war termination acceptable to
the United States by maintaining our capability to
effectively withhold attacks from additional hostage
targets highly valued tor] vital to enemy
leaders ... ,,xs Since the United States would wish more
strongly to limit damage in this scenario to be able to
deal with China afterwards, it would have an increased
interest in enhancing this ability of escalation
control
.
In order to emerge as a powerful enough nation to
balance China after a nuclear exchange with the Soviet
Union, the United States would have a stronger interest
in the goal of escalation control, prevention of war
intensification. That the Soviet Union would have a
similar interest in limiting damage to itself would make
the attainment of this goal easier for the United
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States. Combining other war-fighting goals, the United
States's interest would be to prevent escalation of war
and to terminate nuclear war as soon as possible, which
would lead to keep the damage by war at minimum.
To achieve this goal the United States should take
two methods. First, to sustain the sophisticated, yet
currently vulnerable C 3 I system in the course of any
nuclear exchange. This is vital to controlling
escalation, because the C 3 I system is the eyes and
ears for any leadership when it has to execute nuclear
attack. Without this function nuclear attack would be
that by the blind and deaf, thereby controlling
escalation would be impossible. The C 3 I system would
provide the leadership with the ability to control
action so that responses would not escalate war
unnecessarily; in terms of the timing and pace of attack
before it decides to resort to attack; in terms of the
kind of attack and target so that the Soviet Union could
assess the United States's intentions of the particular
nuclear response. 1 * Thus C 3 I system is
indispensable for escalation control. Necessity to
improve its current vulnerability which was mentioned in
the section of war termination should be once again
emphasized here for the achievement of escalation
control
.
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Secondly, effective escalation control requires the
United States to broaden the range of options in its
flexible nuclear response strategy so that it can
respond to any level of Soviet attack in an appropriate
way. in other words, if the Soviet attack is
conventional, the United States should answer the attack
by conventional weapons. If the Soviet attack is
limited to 10 megaton equivalent warhead against five
United States silos, the United States retaliation
should be also limited in the equal way. The counter-
attack in this case should not be as massive as, for
example, 100 megaton attack against 50 Soviet silos,
because this would quickly escalate the warfare. Thus
the United States should not punish the Soviet
aggression more than necessary, but should do in a
selective and deliberate fashion. Caution would be even
more necessary when the United States decided to
retaliate in the tripolar system. The necessary
instruments for this purpose are small-scale, accurate,
counter-force nuclear weapons.
However, this method to make nuclear force more
accurate and effective for counter-force strategies has
one disadvantage. Acquisition of a great number of such
weapons would seem to the Soviets that the United States
is trying to gain first-strike capability. Achievement
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weapons
of escalation control by deployment of these
would have to be traded off to some extent with a
consideration of crisis stability achievement.
4. Damage Limitation
The United States would also have an increased
interest in damage limitation in the tripolar system; it
has to remain powerful enough to face China after it
engages in war with the Soviet Union. In order to stay
powerful enough to deter China, it is necessary for the
United States to minimize the damage of war. For this,
on top of early termination of war and escalation
control, both strategic and civil defense should be
strengthened. Protecting the civilian sectors which
would be vital for the nation's recovery after war would
be very important.
Particularly with respect to measures of passive
defense, the United States has been relatively
indifferent compared to the Soviet Union. As Raymond
Aron notes:
The fear of escalation in the national defense
budgets, without altering the balance of terror,
affords one partially rational explanation of the
indifference manifested toward measures of passive
defense which would be relatively cheap and
effective (light shelters against radioactive
fallout, stockpiling of the machines and materials
most indispensable to reconstruction, evacuation
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plans for cities, education of the population,
w tC • / •
The fact that the entire population cannot be evacuated
does not mean a nation can neglect civil defense
altogether. With civil defense, nations increase the
chance of survival and decrease the damage to some
extent if nuclear war breaks out. The Soviet Union,
partly due to its history of frequent foreign invasions,
is quite avare of this, and has been engaged in
improving its civil defense programs. An example of
their extensive plan to evacuate leadership in case of
war has been already cited in the section of war
termination.
To limit damage and recover as a functional nation
the United States should improve the currently
insufficient civil defense measures. A program of
evacuating urban population in case of crisis, for
example, should be seriously considered. Besides, by
ensuring that the United States could decrease some
human and material loss through civil defense, it could
enhance deterrence, since it will make the United
States's resolution to retaliate more credible. xe
C. Arms Control
In the tripolar scenario of a neutral China arms
control is extremely important, but more difficult than
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in the bipolar system. Arms control negotiations are
hard even only between the Soviet Union and the United
States; adding one more actor who might have a
significantly different nuclear doctrine from either of
the original superpowers would certainly make arms
control much tougher. China would likely continue to
follow its current nuclear doctrine. At present the
United States tries to deter nuclear attack by Mutual
Assured Destruction; the Soviet Union tries to achieve
deterrence by enhancing war-fighting capability; China
bases deterrence on improving its capability to sustain
the damage and to recover after nuclear war. 1 ®
This particular tripolar system would supply the
least optimum condition for successful arms control. In
the other two tripolar scenarios China would cooperate
with its ally, standing on the side of its partner in
arms control negotiations to increase alliance
security. In this particular scenario, however, China
would act totally independently of, and differently from
both of other two.
Once nonallied China acquires its second strike
capability (even before that), the United States and the
Soviet Union should try to include China to arms control
talks. Whether they want reduction, freeze or change in
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their force structure, trilateral agreement is necessary
for the security in the tripolar system.
Chinese attainment of second strike capability
would also complicate arms control by forcing changes in
existing arsenals. The United States's currently well
balanced force structure among ICBMs, SLBMs
,
and bombers
would be maintained in the tripolar system. With a
presence of China, however, it would have to increase
the number of long-range missiles, particularly that of
SLBMs to maintain second strike capability against both
other superpowers.
The Soviet Union would have to increase the number
of ICBMs targeted on the western part of China, and also
acquire some medium-range missiles along the border with
China to deter its attack. Like the United States the
current force balance would likely to be maintained;
strong emphasis on land-based missiles and less on SLBMs
due to lack of sufficient ports.
The Chinese force would look like something between
those of the United States and the Soviet Union. In
terms of its balance among land-based missiles, SLBMs,
and bombers, Chinese nuclear arsenals would be closer to
that of the United States than the Soviet Union; owing
to its relatively long coast and possession of ice-free
ports, it would emphasize submarines forces more than
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the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since it has to
deter the Soviet Union as veil as United States, it
would need to retain more medium- and short-range
missiles than the United States. At present China does
not have much interest in deploying a large number of
bombers, therefore it is doubtful if it would increase
the number of bombers in this tripolar system. 20
1. Deterrence
In this scenario the United States would want to
establish mutual deterrence with the Soviet Union and
with China. The United States knows that China would
stay as neutral in case of war with the Soviet Union.
As long as nonallied China has a large nuclear arsenal,
however, it would be the Unites States 's goal to have
enough nuclear capability to deter China. For this the
United States should make no agreements inhibiting its
ability to strengthen its second strike capability and
modify its force structure to deal with China.
If China stays as a neutral nuclear power, the
United States could utilize the current nuclear
capability to deter China only. However, it would be
the United States's interest to prepare for the very
worst scenario in this system; deterrence against China
fails, and the Soviet Union also decides to strike the
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United States. Against this case, the United States
would want to deploy weapons to develop its double
second strike capability. First the United States would
want to have enough weapons to have second strike
capability to deter a Soviet's attack. Second, it would
want to have enough capability to inflict unacceptable
damage on China even after it launches its second strike
to the Soviet Union. This would also be in the Soviet's
strategy; strikes back against a China's attack and
still be able to deter the United States's first strike.
To ensure their double second strike capabilities
they would want to change the balance of their force
structure to emphasize bombers or SLBMs, or by making
land-based ICBMs more invulnerable against a first
strike. In this case the Soviet Union's current force
structure which more emphasizes the relatively
vulnerable land-based missiles 21 would be altered so
that it could strengthen its second strike capabilities.
It has been estimated that unacceptable damage for
both the United States and the Soviet Union is 400
megaton equivalent weapons which would destroy 20 to 25
percent of the population and 50 to 67 percent of
industrial capacity. 22 It would take the same amount
of weaponry to inflict unacceptable damage on the
Chinese industry. However, both the United States and
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the Soviet Union would need probably somewhat more
weapons to inflict unacceptable human loss on China,
judging from its population which is not only four to
five times of that of either the United States or the
Soviet Union but also more dispersed. To keep the
credible deterrence capability against the worst case,
the United States would have to make sure to maintain at
least around 1,000 or more megaton equivalent
retaliatory power (400 for the Soviet Union, the rest
for China) in the arms negotiation table.
2. Crisis Stability
The United States should support measures that
improve secure communication networks within and between
the nations. Plans to supplement the hot line and
establish a crisis center to identify and give
information about a developing crisis should be
vigorously pursued. 23 These measures are important in
the bipolar system, but they would be even more
important in this tripolar system. The United States
could also try to make an agreement with the Soviet
Union not to target each other's C 3 I systems.
The above measures should also be extended to
include China; the trilateral C 3 I and Washington-
Moscow-Bei jing "hot line" agreement would be one of the
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few shared Interests of the three participants at the
arms negotiation table.
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CHAPTER III
SCENARIO II: SINO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE
This scenario assumes a tripoiar system where the
United States and China form an alliance against the
Soviet Union. The United States-Ch inese alliance is
based on a mutual security treaty under which the two
nations act jointly against the Soviet Union in case of
conflict in the international system. Since the United
States and China together would have an overwhelmingly
favorable nuclear balance against the Soviet Union, this
scenario has some resemblance with the era of clear
United States nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union
between 1945 and 1957.
A. Deterrence
This particular version of the tripoiar system has
mixed effects on deterrence. Unless the Soviet Union
possesses a nuclear arsenal capable of second strike
against both the United States and China simultaneously,
the Sino-Amer ican alliance will be too formidable a
power for Soviet Union to challenge. Therefore, it
would be much easier for the United States to deter the
Soviet aggression. On the other hand, deterrence would
be considerably jeopardized from the Soviets' point of
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view; the Sino American alliance might regard its
advantage as allowing a first strike.
Judging from the current economic performance of
the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, it is
highly unlikely that they could build up such a large
arsenal to keep up with the S ino-Amer ican alliance. At
present it is estimated that the Soviet Union allocates
as much as 17 percent of its gross national product to
defense, while the United States allocates 6 percent.
This expenditure is placing a heavy burden on the
nation's economy. 2-4 As long as the Soviet economy
grows slowly, there will be serious constraints on its
ability to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal.
Even so, the Soviet situation is not hopeless. The
United States and China would be unlikely to attack the
Soviet Union even in this scenario. Even in the case of
successful United States and Chinese joint first attack
against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would most
likely still possess enough nuclear power to inflict
unacceptable damage on both the United States and China.
It has been estimated that what would be considered
unacceptable damage for the United States is 20 to 25
percent of population loss and 50 to 65 percent of
industry destruction, which would be easily met with the
nuclear destructive power of 400 megaton equivalent. 23
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It is difficult to determine what would be
unacceptable damage for China, and how many weapons
would be necessary to inflict it by the time China
acquires second strike capability. Even today
estimating what China would regard as unacceptable
damage is a much-debated question. 2 * How its economy
develop, and how industry and population spread over the
territory would affect both the definition of
unacceptable damage and the number and size of warheads
required to achieve it. I would roughly estimate,
however, that China, like the United States, would
regard loss of 50 to 65 percent of its industrial base
as unacceptable. This will definitely be the case after
it evolves into an advanced industrial nation which
depends largely on various sectors of its industry such
as electric power generating capacity, petroleum
refining, or iron and steel works.
Secondly, China's unacceptable population loss
would be somewhat more than that of the United States.
China's population is more than one billion compared to
240 million of the United States 27 . A 20 to 25
percent population loss for the United States is 48 to
60 million deaths. The same number of deaths would be a
far lower portion of China's population. Even a
comparable percentage loss, that is, 200 to 250 million,
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would not have the same social impact. Moreover,
judging from the way this population is spread, it would
take more weapons to cause the same number or the same
percentage of casualties in China as in the United
States or the Soviet Union. Its ratio of city
population in the entire population is less than 10
percent compared to United States in the 20 to 30
percent range and the Soviet Union in 30 to 40 percent
range. 2 * Because of these differences I conclude that
it would be necessary for the Soviet Union to possess
about 600 to 800 megaton equivalent of weapons to impose
unacceptable damage on China after receiving the first
strike. At present the average yield of Soviet warheads
is 0.8 megaton and one launcher carries four warheads in
average (4.5 for ICBMs, 3.6 for SLBMs, and 7.6 for
bombers.) 2 * I f we assume that the Soviet Union
continues to have this kind of structure in the tripolar
system, it would need 750 to 1,000 warheads and 185 to
250 launchers to yield 600 to 800 megaton equivalents of
destructive power.
It would be entirely possible for the Soviet Union
to have enough nuclear weapons to launch such an
unacceptable second strike against both nations after it
absorbs the first strike. At present the Soviet Union
has about 8,000 megaton equivalent weapons in total in
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In this
about 11,000 warheads and 2,500 launchers. 30
scenario the Soviet Union night increase it a little,
but would never decrease it. Let us suppose the
optimistic case, that the Soviet Union only maintains
the status quo capability. Even in case of a United
States and China joint counter-force attack against the
Soviet Union, it is impossible for them to destroy all
the Soviet nuclear forces. Assume an extremely
optimistic case; the United States and China succeed in
destroying 80 percent of land-based ICBMs, 70 percent of
SLBMs, and 80 percent of bombers. With the remaining 20
percent of ICBMs (230 launchers and 1,300 warheads), 30
percent of SLBMs (280 launchers and 1,000 warheads), and
20 percent of bombers (30 bombers and 250 warheads), the
Soviet Union would still possess about 2,000 megaton
equivalent weapons. 31 This destructive power would be
enough to inflict unacceptable retaliation to both the
United State and China which require 1,200 megaton
equivalent weapons in total at most.
Hence I suppose that the United States and China
would still prefer to coexist with the Soviet Union
rather than to attack it in this tripolar system; they
would consider it still too costly to engage in a
nuclear fight with the Soviet Union, sacrificing their
own populations and industrial capability. As long as
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there exists a possibility that conventional war
escalates to nuclear war, the S ino-Aroer lean ally would
be also deterred from conventional attack on the Soviet
Union
.
1. Basic Deterrence
In this tripolar system it would be easier for the
United States to deter a Soviet attack on its homeland.
In case of either an all-out attack on the American
homeland or a limited attack on the United States
strategic bases, the United states would have a credible
capability and will to retaliate against the Soviet
aggression. In this tripolar system the credibility of
the United States's will to retaliate would be further
strengthened by its alliance with China. Moreover, the
Soviet Union would have to fight a two-front war once it
starts nuclear attack. As long as the Soviet Union
stays as a rational actor, it would be convinced that it
could not escape from unacceptable damage by the
alliance's second strike.
It would be a wishful calculation for the United
States to think that, splitting the potential damage
with China, it would receive only half of the the damage
it would receive in the bipolar system. But the United
States could rationally assume that the damage would be
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less severe than in the bipolar system. Thus, expecting
less damage from the Soviet Union, the United States's
will to retaliate would be strengthened in this
scenario. This also would be the likely Soviets'
perception; the United States's will to retaliate would
appear more credible in this power system.
Secondly, there would be no question about the
credibility of United States capability to retaliate due
to its alliance with China. With the effect of
increased credibility of the United States's will and
capability, the Soviet Union would be further
discouraged from attacking. Hence, in this tripolar
system it would be easier for the United States to deter
the Soviet attack
.
Finally, in this scenario, the Soviet Union would
have to think about a possibility of fighting against
China most seriously when it starts nuclear attack.
When China becomes an ally of the United States, the
agreement would be likely to be that when one party is
attacked, the other will join the battle and support the
ally at some point. With such an agreement, there would
be no chance for the Soviet Union to emerge as an winner
of the fight after it strikes the United States. Even
if the Soviet Union should have a chance to wipe out the
United States by its attack, it would still have to
fight against China afterwards.
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Even in the status quo, the Soviet Union fears
nuclear exchange with China although China is much a
weaker nation in terms of its military capability.
According to an analysis by Banning N. Garrett and
Bonnie S. Glaser:
The Soviets perceive China, despite its inferiority
in military hardware, as having advantage in
survivability and protracted war capability The
Chinese are aware of the Soviets' fear that
surviving Chinese population and military forces
after a nuclear war would pose a threat to a
crippled Soviet Union . 32
In the current bipolar system China is capable of
deterring the Soviet nuclear attack from an inferior
position. In the tripolar system the Soviets' fear of
China would be even stronger due to its increased
nuclear arsenal. Hence with the fear of fighting a
nuclear war with China, the Soviets' attack against the
United States would be further deterred in the
S ino-Amer ican alliance scenario.
It is hard to imagine in this scenario that the
Soviet Union, being in an inferior position, would be
tempted to attack the United States or China (apart from
a desperate pre-emptive strike). However, suppose the
Soviet Union thinks about destroying the United States 's
ICBMs in an extreme crisis situation. The Soviet
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strategists would assume the United States would be more
encouraged to retaliate with its remaining mobile
missiles and SLBMs than in the bipolar system, out of
assurance that China would join the combat or at least
that China would not take advantage of new United States
weakness
.
Just as it would be impossible for the
Sino-Amer ican alliance to destroy all the Soviet forces
in one blow, it would be also impossible for the Soviet
Union to destroy all the American forces by its first
strike. Currently even a Soviet first strike that
destroys 70 percent of ICBMs, 40 to 50 percent of SLBMs,
and 70 percent of nonalert bombers, does not deprive the
United States of its ability to inflict unacceptable
damage on the Soviet Union; at most 400 megaton
equivalent weapons, or probably less than that, to cause
20 to 25 percent population loss and 50 to 67 percent
industrial capacity damage. 33 This fact would remain
the same in this tripolar system.
In any case the United States's retaliation would
impose major damage on the Soviet forces. China might
aid the United States's action and strike the Soviet
Union immediately after the first strike from the Soviet
Union. Even if China did not start attacking the Soviet
Union at this point, for fear of Soviet counter-
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retaliation, China would certainly join the United
States and attack the Soviet Union. if war broke out,
the Soviet Union would sooner or later have to cope with
two nations at the same time.
This would yield a dreadful consequence for the
Soviet Union; even after it uses up its counter-force
weapons the alliance would still possess considerable
number of counter-force arsenals. In case war does not
end here and further escalates, it would bring a
catastrophic damage to the Soviet Union. Even though
the United States and China would receive severe damage,
losing a significant portion of their populations, they
would still be able to recover from the damage and
eventually start functioning as a nation. The Soviet
Union, however, would be completely shattered, and would
most likely cease to exist as a functional nation.
Even if the Soviet Union decides to attack both the
United States and China at the same time, chances are it
would receive more serious damage than in a bipolar
system. It would be clear to the Soviets that they
cannot destroy all the opposing forces but would leave
the United States and China with enough second strike
capability independently; they would certainly resort to
retaliation against the Soviet Union. With its nuclear
capacity, the Soviet Union is unable to give the same
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degree of damage as what it received to both the United
States and China. in either case, unlike in the bipolar
system, there is not even a slim chance for the Soviet
Union to emerge as a winner in the tripolar system where
the United States and China make an alliance. As long
as the Soviet Union remains as a rational actor, their
calculation would never tempt them to break the
deterrence
.
2 . Extended Deterrence
It would be easier for the United States to achieve
extended deterrence against both Soviet nuclear and
conventional attack in this tripolar system. When the
United States forms an alliance with China, it would
increase the United States's credibility of capability
and will to retaliate in case Europe or Japan is
attacked. In case of Soviet nuclear attack, the United
States together with China could bring an unacceptable
damage on the Soviet Union. In case of its conventional
attack, the S ino-Amer ican alliance would most likely
emerge as victors against the Soviet Union. In the
following, first, I examine the implication of the
Sino-Amer ican alliance to extended nuclear deterrence,
next, to extended conventional deterrence.
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To consider the system's implication to extended
nuclear deterrence, let us assume a conflict in Europe.
Before the Soviets launch an attack on American,
British, or French missiles as the conventional fight
between the NATO and Warsaw Pact intensifies in Europe,
they have to consider what would happen next. in this
situation, the United States's choice would be either:
1. to retaliate by attacking Soviet counter-force
weapons or selected military targets of the Warsaw Pact,
the Soviet Union, or both in a restrained manner, or 2.
to accept the Soviet aggression in Europe and agree to
negotiate
.
In this tripolar system the Soviet Union would have
more reasons to believe the United States would choose
the first choice. First, there would be no question
about the United States's ability to retaliate. It has
its full nuclear capability intact at home. Moreover,
it could also rely on the Chinese arsenal, if
necessary. Secondly, the United States 's will to
retaliate would appear more credible than in the bipolar
system, since the alliance has the ultimate advantage
once war escalates.
The likely Soviet response against the American
retaliation would also encourage the United States to
punish the Soviet Union. Suppose the United States
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retaliates against the original Soviet aggression,
attacking the Warsaw Pact in a limited way. Two
possible Soviet responses to the United States 's
retaliation are: to accept the damage in Eastern Europe
and negotiate due to its fear of escalation, or to
counter
-re ta 1 iate with a full knowledge that it would
lead to a further escalated nuclear fight, probably a
full-scale nuclear war. In the S ino-Amer ican alliance
scenario, the Soviet Union would more likely choose the
first option, since there would be nothing for them to
gain by escalating war. This would in turn encourage
the United States to retaliate against the initial
Soviet attack.
The reason why the Soviet Union would be more
likely to negotiate after receiving the American
retaliation in this scenario is that it would fear the
escalation of warfare. In the bipolar system the Soviet
Union might believe in its relative victory after
nuclear exchange even if it would be terribly damaged.
In this tripolar system the Soviet Union would not
indulge in such an optimism. By the time the fight
involves homeland to homeland nuclear exchange between
the United States and the Soviet Union, China would
certainly join the fight, supporting the United States.
Even in the status quo the Soviet Union fears China's
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capability in protracted war and recovery after nuclear
war, and its possibility to emerge as an eventual victor
as cited in the former tripolar scenario. China would
be an even more formidable foe for the Soviets if they
have to face it after being crippled by the fight with
the United States. All these considerations mean that
extended nuclear deterrence would be easier for the
United States in this diplomatic configuration of the
tripolar system.
The implications of the S ino-Amer ican alliance for
extended conventional deterrence would be also more
favorable than those of the bipolar system. The Soviet
Union would be further deterred from conventional attack
against American allies in this scenario.
First, it is considered that escalation of
conventional war is the one of the most likely paths to
nuclear war . 34 Since the Soviets would be so afraid
of nuclear warfare with the Sino-Amer ican alliance as
mentioned above, it would be extremely cautious about
resorting even to conventional attack against NATO or
Japan due to the fear of its possible escalation to
nuclear war.
Secondly, even without the fear of escalating into
the nuclear fight, the Soviet Union would not be likely
to resort to conventional attack; it would calculate
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there would be a less chance for them to win even a
conventional war in this tripolar system, because of
formidable Chinese conventional power added to the
Western Camp. At present the Soviet Union has 5,226,600
standing forces, while the United States has
2,158,000. 3S in this tripolar system the United
States would gain roughly another 3,200,000 forces which
China has in the status quo. 3 * Moreover, the Soviet
troops and equipment have been criticized for unbalanced
emphasis on quantity rather than quality:
...but Moscow’s reliance on universal conscription
of 18-year-olds means that morale and motivation
are lower than in countries with all-volunteer
forces, like the U.S. and Britain. In conventional
units, the Kremlin has traditionally opted for
quantity over quality, relying on large numbers of
troops and weapons and deemphasizing battle field
initiative and high technology. 3 *7
Thus even in the status quo how the Soviet's more
numerous, yet less sophisticated troops and weapons
would perform in an actual battlefield situation is a
question. It is hard to estimate exactly how much and
what kind of conventional forces China would develop by
the time it acquires the second nuclear strike
capability. Currently the quality of Chinese
conventional forces is not sophisticated. However, I
suppose it would have significantly improved quality of
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forces when it acquires the nuclear superpower status.
Including its force on the United States 's side would
definitely shift the conventional balance of power in a
favorable way for the United States. Also, China's
conventional forces would compensate for the current
conventional military inferiority of NATO and Japan with
respect to the Warsaw Pact 3 *, thereby enhancing the
Sino-Amer lean alliance's extended conventional
deterrence
.
3. Crisis Stability
It would be more difficult for the United States to
achieve crisis stability in this tripolar system than in
the bipolar system. This particular international
system would unavoidably increase the Soviet Union's
fear of the Sino-Amer ican alliance's first strike. In
case of a crisis the Soviet Union might decide to launch
a pre-emptive first strike, not because it thinks it
could win, but because it thinks it would receive less
damage by attacking first.
Both diplomatic measures and careful arras
procurement policies are needed to reduce the likelihood
of Soviet pre-emption. On the diplomatic side, neither
the United States nor China should provoke the Soviet
Union by making it think the two allies are considering
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a first strike. The allies should consistently advocate
and commit themselves to support a no first-strike
posture. Reducing Soviet fear would also be assisted by
an agreement between the S ino-Amer ican alliance and the
Soviet Union that they would not put their nuclear
forces on a high alert position. As for the strategic
program, the United States and China should work to
reduce the vulnerability of their nuclear forces so that
the Soviet Union would not expect that their nuclear
capability could be destroyed by a Soviet first strike
in this tripolar system.
Secondly, the United States would have to accept
some trade-offs between deterrence and crisis
stability. Since this system stabilizes deterrence and
hinders the maintenance of crisis stability, the United
States and China should consider shifting from targeting
of Soviet military bases to its economic or industrial
sectors. The reduced American counter-force capability
would contribute to achieving crisis stability in this
scenario, since it would convince the Soviets that there
is less threat about the survivability of their
retaliatory forces . 39 To make the Soviets sure this
shift matches the actual announced American policy, the
United States should encourage the exchange of
verification of each other’s silos by photo-
reconnaissance satellites and other methods.
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B. War Fighting
In this scenario, the possibility that the United
States together with China could succeed in destroying
the Soviet Union would be higher than in the bipolar
system. The Soviet Union would have to fight against two
nuclear powers and at any level of the escalation ladder
it would have to be able to inflict sufficient damage to
both nations to win. This is surely a hard task.
Although the United States and China would have ultimate
advantage in war fighting, they would still consider
all-out nuclear war unacceptable.
The war-winning goal would acquire increased
relative importance in this scenario compared to the
bipolar system. Once war breaks out, the potential gain
in this game is considerably higher than in the bipolar
system. The United States together with China could
have a relative victory. While pursuing this goal,
however, the United States would have to consider what
the maximum sacrifice is which it could bear. Relative
victory would be possible, but it would be still
accompanied by costs. If the United States could defeat
the Soviet Union and reduce it to a mere regional power
in Europe at relatively low cost while the United States
remains as a dominant power, it would be worthwhile to
pursue this goal after the war starts. On the other
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hand if the cost of victory is 100 million dead and
destruction of majority of economic sectors, it would
not be worth pursuing this goal. Lastly, the
war-termination goal, at least the early termination
would lose its importance somewhat. Escalation control,
and damage limitation goals would have the same, if not
reduced, importance as in the bipolar system.
1. War Winning
In this scenario war winning would be a more
realistic goal for the United States to pursue than in
the bipolar system. I assume that the United States,
even in this scenario with an increased possibility of
gain, would behave cautiously in fear of escalating
damage to its homeland at least at an early stage of
war. If the total price the United States has to pay to
make the Soviet Union unfunctional as a nation is, for
example, 50 million casualties, it would still make its
best efforts not to intensify the war and seek for
negotiation rather than aggressively pursue a clear
relative victory. Therefore, the United States’s likely
initial response to the Soviet limited attack would not
be an all-out response, but a limited counter-force
attack
.
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After the United States and the Soviet Union
exchanged counter-force attacks, China would roost likely
noin the combat, inflicting further damage on the Soviet
Union. By the time the Soviet Union exhausts its
nuclear weapons the United States and China would still
have their nuclear weapons left, thereby threatening the
Soviets with more damage. By this time it is likely
that the Soviets would agree to negotiate with allies,
seeing that escalation would bring no advantage to
them. Alternatively, the Soviet Union might initiate a
counter-value attack in hopes that it would induce the
alliance to be cautious.
If the battle should intensify and the United
States and China had to attack Soviet non-hard targets,
they should target the remaining main industrial sectors
of the Soviet Union. Such damage would mean a slow
Soviet recovery. Therefore, a limited attack on these
sectors would still possibly lead the Soviet leaders to
negotiate with the S ino-Amer ican ally, before inflicting
massive civilian victims on each side.
There is another strategy which the alliance could
pursue for war-winning goal in this system. The
S ino-Amer ican alliance scenario would provide a more
promising environment for a United States-Chinese
adoption of a counter-state strategy. This counter-
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state attack is a strategy which aims at the Soviet
political culture. «° The Soviet Union is a nation
whose functioning heavily depends on its central
authority. The rationale behind the counter-state
attack is that such a centralized state should be quite
vulnerable to the attack on its central security agency
and other bureaucracy that it might cause a total
anarchy in the nation. Colin S. Gray argues:
The Soviet Union, like Czarist Russia, knows that
it can absorb an enormous amount of punishment(loss of life, industry, productive agricultural
land, and even territory), recover, and endure
until final victory provided the essent ia
1
asgqnt? oj. the state remain intact. The principal
assets are the political control structure of the
highly centralized CPSU and government
bureaucracy.
. .
.
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A counter-state attack would have two major effects on
the Soviet bloc. First it would weaken the Soviet Union
domestically. The Soviet regime is not totally
supported by its population apart from the leading
minority European Russians. 42 The destruction of the
central political system which has been containing these
discontented minority populations could open the way to
disintegration of the Soviet society. Second, it would
have serious effect in the Eastern Europe. Local
nationalisms would be asserted and the bloc break up as
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Old antagonisms resurfaced. Both the Soviet Union and
the bloc, then, would cease to exist as effective
political forces. 43
A major problem with this counter-state strategy is
that it conflicts with strategies to achieve other
war-fighting goals. For war termination and escalation
control it would be essential that the Soviet hierarchy,
and their communication system, remain intact. The
elimination of the Soviet leaders is a considerably
risky strategy, since it might escalate the Soviet
attack on the United States and China by transferring
the authority to attack from politicians to military
commanders. Therefore, it would not be until the United
States gives up the possibility to negotiate with the
Soviet Union and decides to accept more possible damage
that it would resort to this strategy. It requires two
parties to negotiate to terminate war or control
escalation; if the Soviet Union does not show respect to
the alliance's efforts to achieve these goal, it would
be the time for them to consider a counter-state attack.
2. War Termination
Even though the United States would have a stronger
incentive to win war, an all-out nuclear war would still
require a considerable price to pay. Therefore,
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although the United States might not be as eager to
pursue this goal as in the scenario I where the third
actor might emerge as the net gainer in the system, it
would still want to keep early war termination as an
option at least at the beginning of war to see how much
willingness the Soviets have to negotiate.
3. Escalation Control
Escalation control to avoid intensification would
be easier to achieve in this tripolar system. At each
level of intensity of the combat the United States and
China should be able to keep the favorable asymmetry of
capabilities against the Soviet Union so that they could
deter the Soviets from further aggression.
This is because, first of all, at each stage of
escalation the Soviet Union would have to cope with two
opponents, not just one. This would put an extra burden
on the Soviet Union. It would have to keep up with
nuclear attack by both the United States and China, and
most likely with enormous conventional attack by China.
Thus the United States and China would have an advantage
in a quantitative sense.
Secondly, in this scenario the United States could
count on China's capability to response appropriately to
the Soviet attack, in case the United States receives a
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fatal attack and becomes unable to keep up with flexible
response. In the bipolar system, for example,
destruction of most United States land-based ICBMs would
severely limit its capability to respond to a Soviet
attack in a limited way; in such a situation the United
States might be forced to retaliate in a massive way and
escalate war quickly, employing remaining weapons which
are less accurate and whose targets cannot be changed
promptly. In the tripolar system the United States
could count on China to play a fail-safe role,
compensating for the United States's disability. Hence
the probability would increase that the United States,
with China's assistance, could seek not to escalate war.
Thirdly, China's sheer number of population and the
way it spreads in the nation is a definite advantage for
escalation control; as investigated in the first
scenario China would likely to be able to absorb more
damage of war than the United States or the Soviet
Union. The United States, having China as its ally,
would find this tripolar system provides a favorable
environment for preventing the Soviet Union from
intensifying war. This is because the side which has
more capacity to bear damage or which fears eruption the
least, will automatically have an advantage at each
level of escalation and thus is able to deter the
further attack by the opponent . 44
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Hence it would be easier for the United States
together with China to pursue escalation control in this
tripolar system. This system would be particularly
effective in deterring the Soviet Union from escalating
the war from the conventional level to the nuclear one.
Compared to the bipolar system, the United States, with
China's contribution of its huge conventional power,
would be able to perform better in a pre-nuclear combat
with the Soviet Union. Having a dominance at
conventional level war, the United States and China
would more likely succeed in getting the Soviet Union to
negotiate at an early stage of war.
4. Damage Limitation
Damage limitation would have the same degree of
importance as in the bipolar system. Since this
international system would make the United States think
that victory in war is more attainable, the United
States might have more incentives to increase its
nuclear war-fighting capability and also to increase its
defense measures to better equip itself to cope with
warfare. In the bipolar system it is often argued that
it is meaningless to spend limited resources on passive
defense measures since once deterrence fails the likely
result is mutual destruction. In a tripolar system
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marked by United States-China alliance, the result of
war would not have to be a total destruction of both
societies. The United States would be more likely to
survive the war and be able to regain its full political
and economic strength. In such a circumstance measures
to eliminate damage of war to a minimum degree would
have a realistic meaning. The improvement of currently
insufficient civil defense measures should be also
seriously considered in this scenario.
C. Arms Control
In this tripolar system the United States and China
would enjoy a very favorable nuclear balance with
respect to the Soviet Union; probably more than enough
to deter the Soviet attack. Therefore, it would be the
United States’s and China's interest to reduce their
arsenals somewhat to ease their military burden. While
engaged in the arms control talks the allies should be
cautious about to what extent they could reduce their
weapons while keeping a enough deterrence capability
against the Soviet Union.
However, since the Soviet Union would unavoidably
perceive the S ino-Amer ican alliance's military power a
serious threat, the most important objective in the arms
control in this scenario for the United States and China
would be to enhance crisis stability.
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The United States should be careful to seek a
coordinated attitude with China toward arms control.
Difference and disagreements between the two nations
should be discussed and solved prior to any talks with
the Soviet Union.
In this scenario each nation would seek to protect
a particular force structure and relative level of
weaponry. The United States would have no need to
increase its arsenals, but could rather reduce them. it
would maintain its current balanced force structure
among ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. The Soviet Union would
try to increase its arsenals as much as possible without
triggering a major S ino-Amer ican reaction. It would
want a larger number of medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) to cope with the Chinese counterparts which
would be installed along the border. To strengthen its
second strike capability, it would also deploy more
bombers. China's nuclear arsenals would probably
consist of numerous MRBMs and IRBMs and a few long-range
missiles to reach Moscow and Leningrad. Unlike in the
first scenario China does not have to worry about
deterring the United States so it would not need as many
long-range missiles. It would, however, maintain the
balanced structure of land-based and submarine-based
missiles
.
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1. Deterrence
Since this particular tripolar system would further
deter the Soviet attack, the biggest priority in arms
control would likely be enhancement of crisis
stability. Hence, measures to stabilize deterrence
would be subordinated when there exists a conflict
between achievement of deterrence and of crisis
stability. However, measures which would enhance
deterrence and crisis stability at the same time, such
as making vulnerable ICBMs more mobile and small, should
be pursued at the negotiation table.
2. Crisis Stability
In this tripolar system the United States might
actually find it has to sacrifice arms control for the
sake of crisis stability. To enhance crisis stability
the United States needs weapons which are less
vulnerable, inaccurate, slow 43
,
and targeted at Soviet
cities rather than forces.
Less vulnerable weapons would convince the Soviets
that they could not destroy the United States nuclear
forces by their first strike, and they would also
enhance deterrence. Inaccurate and slow weapons would
not be able to succeed in destroying the Soviet
retaliatory forces seriously; inaccurate weapons would
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unlikely strike all the targeted Soviet forces and slow
weapons would give the Soviets enough warning time to
counter-act the attack. Hence weapons with these
characteristics would reduce the Soviet fear of an
alliance's attack depriving the Soviet Union of the
retaliatory capability.
Unfortunately, however, these missiles would be
incompatible with deterrence enhancement. Slow and
inaccurate missiles would unavoidably decrease the
credibility of United States successful second strike
capability. The same thing can be said about the
altering the targets. Changing targets from the Soviet
military forces to, for instance, economic or industrial
sectors, would reduce an American retaliatory threat.
Considering the fact that this tripolar system
encourages deterrence and discourages crisis stability,
I think the United States should accept some trade-offs
at the negotiation table which might eliminate
deterrence effect to some extent, by employing weapons
with above characters and by switching the targets.
It is also important to deploy many small missiles
on the ground rather than a few large ones; numerous
small missiles would be unattractive targets for the
Soviet Union, therefore, discourage the Soviet first
strike in a crisis. To deploy many small missiles which
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have these characteristics, rather than a £ev big ones
would serve the United States
-s objective to achieve
crisis stability. However, those missiles are difficult
to verify, therefore making arms control more difficult.
The United States should not seek to deploy
missiles such as the MX, which have great accuracy,
since their dangers outweigh their merit in this
tripolar system. These missiles would make the Soviets
believe that the United States regards a first strike as
militarily advantageous to itself, and therefore, would
push the Soviet toward a pre-emptive strike in a crisis.
On the other hand deployment of cruise missiles
would be compatible with increasing crisis stability,
because they take relatively long time to reach their
targets. The problem with these missiles is that they
are difficult to verify. They are relatively small and
moreover, it is hard to tell if they are nuclear-armed
or conventionally armed.
Considering the significance of ensuring crisis
stability, I assume that it is more beneficial for the
United States to deploy these weapons even if it cannot
come up with a formal arms treaty with the Soviet Union
due to the verification difficulties associated with
these weapons.
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CHAPTER IV
SCENARIO III: SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE
In this section I will investigate the implication
of tripolarity when the Soviet Union and China form an
alliance; a threatening scenario for the United States.
I assume a formal security alliance between the Soviet
Union and China by a written treaty in which China is a
steady ally of the Soviet Union. The United States has
to face opponents having together nuclear arsenals twice
as large as its own.
A. Deterrence
This scenario is roughly a mirror image of the
last. The alliance could deter a United States attack
easily, but the United States would find it difficult to
deter an alliance attack. Yet the United States could
still deter if it were able to maintain a credible
second strike capability against the combined forces of
the alliance.
1. Basic Deterrence
In this version of the tripolar system, the
credibility of United States will to retaliate against
the Soviet attack would be more questionable than in the
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bipolar system. However, that would not be enough for
the Soviet Union and China to attack the United States.
Even in this scenario where the Soviet Union and
China would have a definite quantitative military
advantage over the United States, they would still be
hesitant to attack the United States first. First of
all, just like the United State and/or China could not
deprive the Soviet Union of its second strike capability
in the second scenario, even in a successful Soviet
and/or Chinese first attack, the United States would be
most likely to maintain enough nuclear capability to
inflict unacceptable damage to both nations in this
scenario
.
An unacceptable damage for the Soviet Union is
estimated to be 20 to 25 percent of population loss and
50 to 65 percent of industry destruction, which would
require the nuclear destructive power of 400 megaton
equivalent, or probably less, considering the higher
concentration of population and industry in the Soviet
society.'4 * As I examined in the second scenario, an
unacceptable damage for China would probably be more
than 25 percent of population loss and around 50 percent
of industrial damage. This would require 600 to 800
megaton equivalent weapons. In total, therefore, 1,000
to 1,200 megaton equivalent destructive power would be
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unacceptable
necessary for the United States to inflict
damage to both the Soviet Union and China.
At present the average yield of United States's
nuclear warheads is 0.4 equivalent megatonnage
. if
the United States continues to sustain this level of
destructive power per warhead, it would need 2,500 to
3,000 warheads to yield 1,000 to 1,200 equivalent
megatonnage. As for launchers, one United States
launcher carries seven warheads in average in the status
quo (two for ICBMs, ten for SLBMs, and 15.5 for
bombers ).«• Hence the United States would need to
possess 360 to 430 launchers to carry 2,500 to 3,000
warheads in order to yield 1,000 to 1,200 equivalent
megatonnage
.
Even in a successful first strike by the alliance,
the United States appears able to maintain enough
nuclear capability to inflict unacceptable damage to
each adversary. The United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency assumes that a successful Soviet
first attack on the United States would mean destruction
of 70 percent of ICBMs, 40-50 percent of SLBMs, and 70
percent of bombers. 4 ® Even if the attack is joined by
China, this figure would not change very much; it is
impossible for the alliance to destroy all the United
States 's forces, since certain numbers of submarines are
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at sea and a certain portion of the bombers in the air
at all times. Finally as long as nuclear weapons do not
achieve 100 percent accuracy, it is impossible to
destroy all of the even easily targeted forces such as
land-based ICBMs, submarines in ports, or nonalert
bombers
.
Currently the United States has approximately 5,000
megaton equivalent nuclear weapons in about 13,800
warheads and 1,960 launchers. 30 in this tripolar
scenario, I would suppose that the United States would
increase its military budget and deploy more nuclear
weapons; at present the United States enjoys a GNP which
is approximately twice that of the Soviet Union and
eight times that of China. Even with the Soviet Union
and China combined, the United States still possesses
1.65 times more GNP. 31 Yet its ratio of GNP allocated
to the military spending is only one third of that of
the Soviet Union. 32 It is hard to imagine the United
States would maintain this modest military spending
against a Sino-Soviet alliance. However, even if the
United States would only maintained 5,000 megaton
equivalent arsenals, it would still be able to maintain
the second strike capability to bring unacceptable
damages to both the Soviet Union and China. In case of
the successful first strike by the Soviet Union and/or
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China, the remaining 30 percent of ICBMs (300 launchers
and 678 warheads), 50 percent of SLBMs (320 launchers
and 3,330 warheads), and 30 percent of bombers (95
bombers and 1490 warheads) would yield about 2,200
megaton equivalent power, 03 which exceeds the 1,200
megaton equivalent required to impose unacceptable
damage on the alliance. Therefore, in terms of
capability, the United States would be credible enough
to deter the alliance's attack.
More problematic would be the credibility of United
States will to retaliate. Suppose the United States
receives a nuclear attack from the alliance after some
conflict takes place. In this tripolar scenario, there
would be no chance for the United States to emerge as a
winner, enjoying a relative victory after nuclear war,
and it would have a stronger interest not to escalate
the war than in the bipolar system.
With this apparently decreased desire to escalate
war, the United States's will to retaliate would appear
less credible to the Soviet Union and China. The United
States might actually choose to negotiate rather than
retaliate and escalate war, inviting a second round of
nuclear bombardment from the alliance. However, it is
hard to say which option the United States would choose
against the alliance's first strike. If the United
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States decides that the alliance also desires to avoid
unacceptable damage, it would resort to a limited
retaliation to show its will to fight in hopes that the
allies would agree to negotiate rather than intensify
the war.
To sum up, a tripolar system marked by a
Sino-Soviet alliance would provide less favorable
environment for the United States to achieve basic
deterrence than the bipolar system. However, the
situation is not entirely hopeless. First, the United
States would retain at least 2,200 megaton equivalent
weapons after the successful alliance's first strike
which would be able to inflict unacceptable damage to
both nations. This capability would be a threat to the
Soviet Union and China, and would force them to behave
cautiously. They cannot make the United States
defenseless by their first strike to the degree that it
cannot bring the second strike capability to them.
Second, although the United States's credibility of will
to retaliate would decrease, the alliance could never be
certain that the United States would not retaliate.
This uncertainty of will combined with the clear second
strike capability would pose the Soviet Union and
China. Therefore, I assume that even in this scenario
the Soviet Union and China would choose to coexist with
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the United States rather than take major risks by
launching a nuclear first strike.
2. Extended Deterrence
Extended deterrence against either a nuclear or
conventional attack by the alliance would also diminish
in a tripolar system featuring a Sino-Soviet alliance.
If the Soviet Union succeeds in destroying a United
States ally, it would be a direct gain for the
Sino-Soviet camp, weakening the United States power. In
the following I will examine the cases of deterring
nuclear and conventional attack separately.
For extended deterrence against the alliance's
nuclear attack, credibility of United States will to
retaliate matters most. The Soviet Union and China
would likely think that the United States would be more
reluctant to retaliate after Europe or Japan is
attacked, exposing its own homeland to counter-
retaliation from both nations, and escalating war. The
United States would be more fearful of escalating war in
this scenario than in the bipolar system, because it has
no chance of being a relative victor at any level of war
escalation
.
After a nuclear attack on Western Europe or Japan
the United States has to consider that retaliation
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against the Soviet Union or China would be followed by a
counter-retaliation from the alliance, most likely
concentrated on cities and industrial areas. Such an
escalation of war would surely bring further damage to
the United States, and worst of all, even if the United
States bears the damage, it could not expect ultimate
victory. Therefore, as long as the damage is limited to
the European continent or to Japan, the United States
would be more inclined to negotiate with the Sino-Soviet
alliance from even an inferior position, rather than
retaliate. This decreased credibility of the American
will to retaliate would likely tempt the alliance to
attack American allies.
An even more disturbing result of this
international system for the United States would be the
erosion of extended deterrence against the Sino-Soviet
alliance's conventional attack. Here, the problem would
be the United States's and its ally's capability rather
than will. At present the Warsaw Pact enjoys a wide
margin of relative advantage in conventional forces over
NATO. For instance, the Warsaw Pact has twice as many
divisions as NATO, and it possesses 68,300 main battle
tanks which are also twice as many as NATO does.
Japan's military forces are much more limited than
NATO's.® 4 Combined together, the Soviet Union and
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China would create the most formidable conventional
military power in the world. Adding China's huge
conventional power to the Soviet side of the present
unfavorable balance of conventional forces would be a
significant threat to the security of American allies.
Even today the United States's and its ally's
conventional military forces are criticized as
inadequate to deter the Soviet conventional attack with
high credibility. Albert Carnesale, Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
and Graham T. Allison argue:
By choosing to rely on early nuclear use, the
United States and its European and Japanese allies
have opted for defense "on the cheap." Current
political preferences make an early reversal of
this policy unlikely, but it is not unaffordable.
The Soviet Union enjoys no economic advantage over
the United States. Quite the reverse: the U.S.
gross national product ( GNP ) is roughly twice that
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States
and its allies enjoy a combined GNP more than four
times that of the Soviet Union and its allies. ss
Improving the United States's and its ally's
conventional forces would be the top priority for
enhancing extended deterrence in this tripolar system.
This is even more important than in the bipolar system,
since this system provides greater temptation for a
Sino-Soviet conventional attack against the American
allies. The alliance could achieve the victory in
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Europe or In Japan more easily than the Soviets could In
the bipolar system.
3. Crisis Stability
In this particular scenario, the United States does
not have to worry about the alliance's fear of an
American first strike since such an act would be highly
irrational. Rather, the alliance would have to consider
whether the United States might be driven to launch a
pre-emptive strike against the alliance. Hence it would
be the allies' responsibility to reduce United States
fear of their first strike as long as it wants to
maintain deterrence.
Although the United States would not carry the main
burden of enhancing crisis stability in this tripolar
system, it could still contribute to enhancing
stability. The United States could, for example, make
efforts to extend its warning systems to avoid accident
due to false alarms. It could also avoid putting its
forces in high-alert position or upgrade its safety
devices so that the first strike would not be triggered
easily. Albert Carnesale, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and
Graham T. Allison state:
Of particular concern is the absence of PALs
(permissive action links) on the nuclear warheads
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on submarine-launched ballistic
launch of these weapons even in
express order from the president
successor
.
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missiles, enabling
the absence of an
or his authorized
Such improvements would aid the United States to enhance
crisis stability and make nuclear war less likely.
B. War Fighting
In this scenario the Sino-Soviet alliance has a
clear advantage in war fighting over the United States.
How the United States should make a war-fighting
strategy depends on how the Soviet Union and China
interpret the likely outcome of war.
As stated in the section of deterrence, the United
States would probably be able to carry out second
strikes inflicting unacceptable damage on both the
Soviet Union and China. The Soviets would most likely
suffer at least 50 to 60 million dead and loss of 50 to
65 percent of their industry.* 7 If, however, the
United States concentrates most of its forces on Soviet
targets, the Soviet Union could suffer loss of 100
million population loss and 70 percent of its industrial
base .
This United States nuclear capability would
encourage the Soviets to adopt a limited war strategy.
It would engage in war in a cautious manner, trying to
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prevent war from escalating further at every level of
combat
,
and trying to negotiate with the United States
before it suffers unacceptable damage. After all
nuclear war is too costly even in this scenario where
the Sino-Soviet alliance has a clear advantage in war
fighting. Thus, the United States should prepare its
war-fighting policy based on this assumption that the
alliance would wish to avoid an all-out nuclear war in
this tripolar system.
1. War Winning
In this tripolar system this policy goal would be
unattainable. In the bipolar system there might be such
a thing as a relative victory after the all-out war. In
this tripolar system, however, there is definitely not a
chance for the United States to emerge as victor. It is
totally impossible for the United States to shatter both
the Soviet Union and China without being shattered
itself. Thus it is not sane for the United States to
try to seek victory in this power distribution. The
United States should elaborate strategy to achieve other
war-fighting goals.
2. War Termination
This would become an important goal for the United
States. The task for the United States in this power
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system would be to terminate war as soon as possible
with an acceptable negotiation; war termination would be
meaningless
,
if the negotiation imposes the United
States's disintegration, for instance. As long as the
alliance dreads going to all-out war and it sees that
the United States is ready to engage in such a warfare
if the content of negotiation offer is unacceptable,
there should be some opportunity to terminate war with
both sides' concession after some level of intensity
ladder
.
To leave the opportunity to cease fighting at some
point of warfare through clear negotiation, first of
all, it is important for the United States to protect
its communication links with the Soviet Union and
China. The currently vulnerable "hot line" between the
United States and the Soviet Union would have to be
greatly improved in this tripolar system, and reliable
communication links with China would have to be
established. Otherwise there would be no chance for the
leaders of three nations to stay in sufficient contact
to negotiate an end to the war. It would also be in the
United States 's interest for the Soviet Union and China
to have a reliable communication line between
themselves. Otherwise it would be difficult for the
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alliance to reach an agreement about when and under what
stipulations to cease fire.
Next, current American plans for early attack on
the Soviet C 3 I systems*- should be altered. In the
same way the United States should not attack the Chinese
C 3 I systems, either. As stated in the first scenario,
although communication disruption might limit the damage
on the United States the damages it poses seem greater.
Even if political leaders succeed in negotiating to
terminate war, communication disruption might make it
impossible for them to circulate cease-fire orders to
the various military units. Since the United States
would have a greater interest in terminating war in this
tripolar system than in the bipolar system, it should
not attack its opponents' C 3 I systems. It should also
avoid strategies based on attacking either ally's
leadership as most American strategists agree in the
bipolar system.**
At the same time the United States should make
greater efforts to improve its own communication and
information systems, which are now highly vulnerable to
even a limited nuclear attack. Since the Soviet Union
and China would have no more interest in negotiating
with the United States in this scenario than in the
bipolar system, the American C 3 I system would be a
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target. Hence the United States should take the same
measures to strengthen its C 3 I systems and protect
political leaders in this scenario as it would in the
bipolar system.
3. Escalation Control
It would be almost impossible for the United States
to keep the Sino-Soviet alliance from escalating war,
because at every level the alliance would be able to
maintain a favorable asymmetry of capabilities. In this
scenario the United States would have to fight a
two-front war, inflicting an appropriate level of damage
to both nations at an appropriate time. This burden
would ensure less satisfactory performance of the United
States in escalation control strategy than in any other
scenarios
.
Although the Sino-Soviet alliance would have the
ultimate advantage in war-fighting, they would not want
war to escalate to the extent they suffer "unacceptable
damage." They would accept great damage if the
existence of their nations were at stake. However, they
would not likely be willing to bear as much suffering
for anything less. Even reducing the United States to a
second rank power would not be sufficient compensation
for suffering the unacceptable damage defined earlier.
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Therefore, the alliance would likely try to prevent war
from intensifying at each escalation level, and try to
seek negotiation with the United States in this
scenario. The best the United States could do in this
situation would be to fight enough at any given level of
escalation so that it could induce as favorable peace
terms as possible from the alliance.
4. Damage Limitation
The United States would have to make greater
efforts to limit damage in this tripolar system. The
damage which would be imposed by the opponents would be
more severe in this scenario, since the United States
would be fighting against two nuclear powers, not only
one as in the bipolar system. The United States should
seek to develop its currently insufficient civil defense
programs, such as the urban evacuation plan, for damage
limitation as discussed in other two scenarios.
C. Arms Control
In this scenario the United States should seek to
narrow the nuclear gap between the alliance and itself.
It should also urge its European allies and Japan to
build up their arsenals. Unlike the Soviet Union or
Warsaw Pact, the United States, European allies, and
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up thetr nuclear
Japan should be able to afford to build
arsenals to cope with this threatening scenario.
Even if the United States could not achieve a near
parity with Sino-Soviet alliance, it should vigorously
seek to maintain a credible second strike capability so
that deterrence would not fail. To enhance deterrence
would be the most important objective for the United
States in this scenario. At the same time the United
States should try to convince the Sino-Soviet alliance
that it should reduce some of its arsenal to enhance the
crisis stability for their own sake.
In this scenario the three nations would also have
distinctive preferences. The United States would want
to increase its overall nuclear arsenal. It would
particularly try to increase the number of SLBMs and
mobile ICBMs to strengthen its second strike
capability. The Soviet Union would maintain its current
arsenal or might even reduce it, since it would not have
to worry about Chinese intentions. Unlike in the other
scenarios or in bipolar system, it could abandon those
IRBMs and MRBMs directed at Chinese targets. Its
balance between among ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers would
likely remain the same. The Chinese arsenal would
mostly consist of long-range missiles to reach the
United States and Europe. This is because it would not
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have to worry about deterring a Soviet attack as in the
first or second scenario. Its possession of ice-free
harbors along the Pacific allows it to have a balanced
force structure between ICBMs and SLBMs like the United
States. Its current reluctance to develop bombers means
that China would split its forces among ICBMs and SLBMs
only. It appears unlikely to develop a "triad" like the
Soviets or American possess.
1. Deterrence
To have enough double second strike capability
against both the Soviet Union and China the United
States would have to sustain at least around 1,200
megaton equivalent power. In the arms control in this
scenario it would be the United States's vital interest
to maintain weapons which could yield this much
destructive power to keep deterrence.
The United States should demand that the alliance
reduce the number of Soviet and Chinese missiles with
high accuracy. Such Soviet missiles at present could
destroy 85-90 percent of American land-based missiles in
theory.* 0 In this scenario China would most likely
possess missiles with same degree of accuracy. Although
land-based missiles are not the only weapons the United
States would retain, enhancing deterrence in this
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tripolar system requires that even the threat
this leg of American triad be reduced. Reduction of
those accurate weapons would also enhance crisis
stability, mitigating the fear of the United States that
the alliance counter-force attack would deprive it of
nuclear capability. Hence it would be possible that the
alliance compromises and forgo some of their accurate
missiles as long as they are interested in crisis
stability.
The United States would have to face the alliance
at the negotiation from a weak position in terms of its
arsenal's quantitative features. To extract favorable
concessions from the alliance to strengthen deterrence
such as the reduction of their number of weapons, it
would be very important for the United States to
maintain its current edge in weapons technology. So long
as the United States has qualitative advantages which
the alliance regards as important and unduplicable in a
near future, it could use them as bargaining chips in
return for alliance force reductions or rearrangements.
2. Crisis Stability
The United States ability to strengthen crisis
stability through arms control would be limited in this
scenario. It would be mainly the alliance's burden to
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convince the United states that they are not seeking to
deprive it of its second strike capability.
As has been seen, even in this scenario the Soviet
Union and China would likely regard nuclear war as
costly and would prefer to peacefully coexist with the
United States. Hence they would probably have a
considerable interest in enhancing crisis stability
through negotiations. The United States would also wish
to ensure that the alliance does not have an incentive
to attack first in a crisis. These parallel interests
should lead the alliance and the United States to
mutually satisfactory agreements in strengthening crisis
stability. As noted in the preceding discussion of
deterrence, it would be possible for the United States
to persuade the alliance to reduce the number of their
accurate missiles for crisis stability, or to replace
some of their missiles with short flight tiroes with slow
missiles. These measures would not only enhance crisis
stability but also enhance the United States
deterrence. Other measures both the United States and
the alliance could easily agree on would be keeping
submarines in enough distance from the opponent's
coasts, or avoiding keeping bombers in high alert
position so that they could raise the nuclear threshold.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
After examining the implication of China's
attaining superpower status in each scenario, it is
clear that the question of whether a tripolar nuclear
system would be more stable than the current bipolar
nuclear system depends largely on the nature of
alignments among the three great powers.
A tripolar system in which two of the superpowers
are aligned against the third is more unstable than the
bipolar system. The two-power side immediately topples
the balance of power in the system, increasing its power
relative to the third superpower. This gives the
alliance more incentives to attack the relatively weaker
side. At the same time the system increases the
possibility that the underdog pre-empts out of the fear
that the opponents are undertaking to attack it.
On the other hand, presence of a nonaligned third
nuclear superpower creates a system more stable than the
bipolar system. This is because the two original
superpowers develop a common interest despite the basic
antagonism. They want to avoid a major fight between
themselves so that the third superpower would not be an
automatic gainer in the system over the two crippled
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superpowers after the fight. Thus the two original
superpowers would act in a more cautious way, taking
into account the presence of the third superpower.
Mandelbaum states in his Ttis. Nuclear Revolution .
The emergence of another major nuclear power couldhe senousiy unsettling.
...Of all the possiblemultipolar systems, moreover, one involving threemajor powers might well be the most perilous,because the change of allegiance of any one of theprincipals would always be decisive, as is not thecase in a multipolar system.
It is clear that Mandelbaum presupposes in the
above argument that the third major power is a fairly
unstable ally or at least it is not a solid independent
power in the system. He is absolutely correct to argue
that the tripolar system is unstable as long as the
third superpower frequently shifts its allegiance or
joins another superpower as a permanent ally. This
argument is not, however, inclusive, since it disregards
the possibility of the third nuclear superpower being a
stable nonaligned nation.
Nuclear proliferation has been criticized as
destabilizing the international system. It would be
dangerous if a dozen of small- or medium-size nations
become nuclear powers, especially if they were
politically unstable, lacked second strike capability or
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had unsophisticated control systems. Though emergence
of a stable
, nonaligned third nuclear power having
second strike capability will have an advantageous
effect for international peace, the same condition is
less likely to be attained in a world of four or more
such superpowers. The temptation to form and re-form
alliance would be far greater.
Besides, a multipolar nuclear system is not
attainable in the foreseeable future. There are few
states in the current international system that could
become full nuclear superpowers. To do so, a state has
to possess necessary resources and technology to produce
second strike nuclear capability, and sophisticated
command and control systems to ensure against accident.
More importantly, the nation has to possess large
territory and population so that it could not be
shattered by a single first nuclear strike. This
requirement eliminates many of the nations which meet
the first requirement, such as most of the nations in
Europe. China is one of the few nations which would
likely satisfy all the necessary conditions in the
future. The most promising candidates after China are
India and Brazil. Yet they appear to be further from
attainment of superpower status than China.
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For now, therefore, if any change takes place in
the current bipolar system at all, it would be a
transformation to a tripolar system with China as the
third nuclear superpower. Considering this probability,
it is not a bad thing for the United States or for the
Soviet Union that China would likely stay as a
nonaligned power in the future. Chinese nonalignment
would create the most stable system among other tripolar
scenarios investigated in this thesis and a more stable
system than the current bipolar one as well.
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